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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. SUPREME COURT NO. 19184 
HEATHER S. AMICONE, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case involves an obscenity conviction pursuant to 
U.C.A. §76-10-1204 for the exhibition of an allegedly obscene 
film to an audience of consenting adults at the Studio Theatre 
in Salt Lake City, Utah. 
LOWER COURT DISPOSITION 
The instant appeal arises out of a dec1s1on rcnJcrcrl b; 
the District Court of the Third Judicial D1str1ct in and for 
Salt Lake County, wherein the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson 
affirmed the judgment of conviction of the Circuit Court, Salt 
Lake Department, Salt Lake City. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant does not seek a reversal of her conviction but, 
instead, seeks an order remanding this case to the trial court 
for resentencing free of the stricture of U.C.A. §76-10-
1204 (2) which purports to require a mandatory minimum jail 
sentence of 7 days without possibility of probation or suspen-
sion of sentence in any way. 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court's appellate jurisdiction is invoked pursuant 
to U.C.A. §78-3-5. 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
The sole issue raised in the present appeal is whether or 
not the mandatory jail requirement for first time obscen1t1 
violators contained in U.C.A. §76-10-1204(2) is constitutional, 
-2-
,~n its face and as applied to the appellant. Appellant does 
not otherwise attack any portion of the state obscenity statute 
1therwise challenge the validity of her conviction. 
Appellant's challenge to the manda~ory jail requirement of 
IJ.C.A. §76-10-1204 (2) is based upon the four grounds set forth 
below: 
1. U.C.A. §76-10-1204 (2), which requires mandatory jail 
sentences for first time violators of Utah's obscenity statute, 
impermissibly chills the exercise of protected expression, in 
violation of the free speech guarantees of the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and, 
independently, of Article I, §15 of the Constitution of Utah. 
2. Where, as here, a requirement of a mandatory jail 
sentence is applied to a relatively minor first time offense by 
a non-managerial employee, and where, as here, mandatory jail 
sentences are not required by Utah law for any other comparable 
offenses, and where, as here, mandatory jail sentences are not 
required for first time obscenity violators in any other state, 
such a requirement deprives the appellant of her right to due 
process of law, secured by the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution, which right includes the right to 
be free from cruel and unusual punishment as most recently 
articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Solem v. 
Helm, 103 S.Ct. 3001 (1983). The mandatory jail requirement 
independently violates the cruel and unusual punishments clause 
~r Article I, §9 of the Constitution of Utah. 
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3. Where, as here, mandatory J..._:1 J_ "' "t""' \'S d[t:' nr)t 
required under Utah law for first time ·1,,L1t· <~Ir s of an/ 
comparable offenses, and particular l~· whc:rl~, J.S flt-'-' r(-' I t llt:: 
State's only mandatory Jail requirement tor a relat1•~ly minor 
offense is directed at those engaged in a medium of communica-
tion which is presumptively protected by the free speech 
guarantees of the state and federal Constitutions, the mandato-
ry sentencing provision of U.C.A. §76-10-1204 (2) violates the 
equal protection guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution and the parallel requirement of 
Article I, §24 of the Constitution of Utah providing that all 
laws of general nature should have uniform operation. 
4. The mandatory sentencing requirement of U.C.A. §76-
10-1204 (2) violates the constitutional requirement of separa-
tion of powers by depriving a trial court of its traditional 
judicial function of determining whether, under the circum-
stances of a particular case, a sentence would more appropri-
ately be suspended pending successful completion of probation. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
1. On the date alleged in the complaint in this case, 
appellant was employed as a ticket taker at the Studio Theatre, 
located at 228 South State Street, Salt Lake Cit/, Utah. In 
that capacity, appellant sold a theatre ticket to a police 
officer and was subsequently charged with a violation of U.C.A. 
§76-10-1204 (Utah's obscenity statute), a Class A misdemeanor. 
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Un July 6, 1982, the appellant entered a plea of 
1: befure Circuit Judge Eleanor S. Lewis. 
J. Under general provisions of Utah law applicable to 
,11 Class A misdemeanors, the maximum possible sentence is one 
/ear in Jail [U.C.A. §76-3-204 (1)] and a $1,000 fine [U.C.A. 
~"ib-3-301 (3) J. However, under U.C.A. §76-10-1204 (2), a 
mandatory minimum sentence of seven days must be imposed by the 
court upon all first-time violators of this one particular 
Class A misdemeanor offense. 
4. Prior to the time of sentencing, appellant argued 
that the mandatory Jail requirement of U.C.A. §76-10-1204(2) 
was unconstitutional. Nonetheless, on August 30, 1982 the 
Court sentenced the appellant to pay a fine of $1,000.00 and to 
serve one year in jail, all but seven days of the jail sentence 
to be suspended (as required by U.C.A. §76-10-1204(2)). 
5. The appellant, a first offender, was in all respects 
a good candidate for probation, but was sentenced to seven days 
in Jail solely because of the requirements of the statute. 
6. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal to the 
Third District Court in and for Salt Lake County and challenged 
in that Court only the terms of her sentence, not the validity 
of her conviction. Each of the grounds of appeal set forth 
herein was asserted before the District Court. 
7. On March 10, 1983, the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, 
Judge of the District Court, in a two-page opinion, rejected 
Jµµellant's challenge to the mandatory sentencing requirements 
ot u.C.A. §76-10-1204 (2). Thereafter appellant filed a timely 
-5-
notice of appeal to this Court. 
8. Pursuant to the order of the Judge who sentenced the 
defendant, the Honorable Eleanor S. Lewis, imµos1tion of the 
appellant's seven day jail sentence has been stayed pending her 
appeal to this Court. 
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ARGUMENT 
I 
U.C.A. §76-10-1204 (2)' WHICH REQUIRES 
MANDATORY JAIL SENTENCES FOR FIRST TIME 
VIOLATORS OF UTAH'S OBSCENITY STATUTE 
IMPERMISSIBLY CHILLS THE EXERCISE OF 
PROTECTED EXPRESSION, IN VIOLATION OF THE 
FREE SPEECH GUARANTEES OF THE FIRST AND 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTION AND, INDEPENDENTLY, OF ARTICLE 
I, §15 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF UTAH. 
To the knowledge of appellant's counsel, the issue raised 
herein is one of first impression nationwide, i.e., does the 
First Amendment .!I tolerate a legislative requirement of 
mandatory jail sentences without possibility of parole for 
first time violators of a state's misdemeanor obscenity 
statute. 
At the outset, it is crucial to point out that this First 
Amendment challenge by appellant is separate and distinct from 
any other arguments against mandatory sentences that are raised 
I I For purposes of this brief, appellant will use the term 
"F'trst Amendment" as a shorthand reference to the free speech 
rights guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
United States Constitution as well as by Article I, §15 of the 
Constitution of Utah. 
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elsewhere in this brief. 
ing pornographic material" "s a 11 ;;,,,_ H m1 sdcmt ·a ncJ t • 
Subdivision (2) of that statute provides as follows: 
"(2) Each separate offense under this 
section is a class A misdemeanor punishable by 
a minimum mandatory fine of not less than SlOO 
plus $10 for each article exhibited up to the 
maximum allowed by law and by incarceration, 
without suspension of sentence in any way, for 
a term of not less than 7 days, notwithstand-
ing any provisions of Section 77-35-17." 
(Emphasis added.) 
At the time of the conduct alleged in the complaint in this 
case, the above-quoted statute was the only one in the Criminal 
Code (Title 76 of the Utah Code Annotated) of the State of Utah 
which required a mandatory j ai 1 sentence for a non-capita 1 
offense ~ 1 . It is respectfully submitted that the sole reason 
why this mandatory sentence requirement was enacted by the 
Legislature was to chill and inhibit the exercise of protected 
expression by those working in bookstores or theatres dealing 
in constitutionally protected, though sexually oriented, media 
materials. In its recent opinion in Minneapolis Star v. 
Minnesota Com'r of Revenue, U.S. 103 S.Ct. 1365, 1369 
( 1983) ' the United States Supreme Court authoritatively 
2/ Although the Criminal Code has recently been amended to 
add mandatorv sentences for a number of non-capital felony 
offenses, it. is appellant's belief that there are no other 
misdemeanor offenses in the Criminal Code which require 
mandatory sentences nor does any provision of state law require 
mandatory sentences for as comparatively innocuous an offense 
as a first-time obscenity violation by a non-managerial 
employee. 
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·1·otrued its previous opinion in Grosjean v. American Press 
_Inc., 297 U.S. 233, 56 S.Ct. 444 (1936), as standing for 
·roposition that an improper legislative motive is enough, 
c;t dnding alone, to invalidate a statute where the attack is 
based upon the First Amendment, even in the absence of evidence 
that the effect of the statute would otherwise violate the 
First Amendment. 
Independent of the argument of legislative intent des-
cribed above, the effect of the mandatory sentencing require-
ment of U.C.A. §76-10-1204 (2) upon protected expression, if 
upheld by this Court, will be severe indeed. The statute will 
not only chill the exercise of protected expression by the 
appellant, but, more importantly, will severely chill such 
speech by other bookstore and theatre employees throughout the 
state. Employees in adult motion picture theatres and in adult 
bookstores are engaged in businesses presumptively protected by 
the First Amendment and each and every item sold or exhibited 
therein is also presumptively protected by the First Amendment 
until judicially proven to the contrary in a final judgment. 
That the materials contain sexual depictions does not 
guarantee that the items will exceed the limits of a 
corrununity's tolerance when exhibited or distributed in the 
context of an adults-only theatre or bookstore. Indeed, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently 
~f tirmed the judgment of a federal district court in New York 
1dn ch ruled that the motion picture "Deep Throat" and numerous 
•1ther motion pictures of comparable or greater explicitness 
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were not obscene as a matter of fact and law. United States v. 
Various Articles of Obscene Merchandise, Schedul<~ No. 2102, ,l<'J 
F.2d 132 (2nd Cir. 1983). While it is of course true that 
corrununity standards of tolerance may vary from one corrunun1ty to 
another and can also vary over time, no one can conclude, even 
in a city such as Salt Lake City, that a particular sexually 
oriented film or magazine, even of the "hardcore" type, will 
ultimately be found legally obscene and thus, without 
constitutional protection. ll 
By mandating a minimum non-suspendable jail sentence of 
seven days in every case, U.C.A. §76-10-1204 (2) [hereinafter 
"the statute"] severely intimidates those theatre or bookstore 
employees who have no financial interest other than their 
hourly wages from fully and robustly selling or exhibiting 
sexually oriented materials which are in fact constitutionally 
protected. It is respectfully submitted that, were this 
statute to be upheld by the Court, the effect on the 
corrununication media would be such that it would become 
impossible to find employees willing to risk the possibility 
that a particular film or book which they knew to be 
presumptively constitutionally protected would ultimately be 
Indeed, proof of the inability of a layperson such as a 
ticket seller or even a police officer, to accurately determine 
obscenity prior to a final judicial determination comes from 
the Supreme Court's decisions in Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 
496, 93 S.Ct. 2796 (1973) and Lee Art Theatre v. Virginia, 392 
U.S. 636, 88 S.Ct. 2103 (1968) where the Court held that police 
officers are not even qualified to make a determination of 
obscenity for probable cause purposes prior to a seizure of 
materials. 
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Jl_liid r-:;bscene. Consequently, the inevitable effect of this 
, "11tc will be to cause the closure of these businesses and 
tlUQlly eliminate all constitutionally protected sexually 
011ented media materials from the State of Utah. 
While traditional criminal punislunents providing for jail 
sentences in the discretion of the court no doubt have their 
own chilling impact ii it is respectfully submitted that the 
degree of chilling impact inherent in a mandatory sentencing 
law upon a first time offender who acts simply in the capacity 
as a clerk or ticket taker is so great as to compel its 
invalidation under the First Amendment. 
The differential impact of a mandatory, versus a 
non-mandatory, sentencing statute on a non-managerial clerk is 
indeed substantial. As a factual matter, the courts in this 
and most other jurisdictions with which counsel is aware, almost 
always exercise their discretion to suspend a jail sentence for 
a first-time obscenity violator who simply works in the 
capacity as a ticket taker or clerk. This is no doubt due to 
the awareness of these courts that obscenity is difficult to 
ascertain notwithstanding the fact that the Supreme Court has 
4/ The Supreme Court acknowledged this point 
California [361 U.S. 147, 154-155, 80 S.Ct. 215, 
where it struck down an obscenity statute which 
chilling due to its lack of a scienter standard. 
stated: 
in Smith v. 
219 (1959) l 
was unduly 
The Court 
"Doubtless any form of criminal obscenity statute 
applicable to a bookseller will induce some 
tendency to self censorship and have some 
inhibitory effect on the dissemination of material 
not obscene . . 
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narrowly upheld such statutes against vac1tH'nPss at tacks. 
As evidence of the inherent inab1l1ty ot a clterk 'H 
ticket taker to know in advance what will or will not be founJ 
obscene, compare the holdings in the following cases: Jenkins 
v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 94 S.Ct. 2750 11974), [where both a 
Georgia jury and the Georgia appellate courts had found the 
major-release film "Carnal Knowledge" (featuring such Hollywood 
stars as Jack Nicholson, Ann Margaret and Art Garfunkel) 
legally obscene while the United States Supreme Court found the 
film constitutionally protected]; Penthouse International, Ltd. 
v. McAuliffe, 610 F.2d 1353 15th Cir. 1980) [where the Fifth 
Circuit Court of Appeals found an issue of Playboy Magazine 
constitutionally protected but found an issue of Penthouse 
Magazine to be legally obscene-the District Court had found 
both magazines to be constitutionally protected!]; State v. 
Walden Book Company, 386 So.2d 342 (La. 1980) [where the 
Louisiana Supreme Court, while citing and applying the exact 
standards used by the Fifth Circuit in McAuliffe, supra reached 
the opposite conclusion and held that a particular issue of 
Penthouse Magazine was in fact constitutionally protected]; 
United States v. Various Articles of Obscene Merchandise, 
Schedule #2102, supra, 709 F.2d 132 (2 Cir. 1983) [where the 
Second Circuit, as mentioned previously, affirmed the District 
Court's conclusion that the films "Deep Throat", "The Opening 
of Misty Beethoven", "Debbie Does Dallas", "Wide World of 
Spurts", "The Ecstasy Girls", and "Behind The Green Door", 
among others were not obscene in violation of federal customs 
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Obviously, the point to be drawn from these authorities 
1 ce that it is impossible for any hourly wage employee in a 
theater or bookstore or anyone else to predict in advance 
whether a particular item will ultimately be found obscene in 
the courts. Under a statute which gives a court discretion to 
suspend a sentence, a first time violator can point to the 
inherent vagueness of these censorship laws and entertain a 
very realistic expectation of leniency from a sentencing judge. 
By contrast, a mandatory sentencing statute, if upheld by the 
courts, will have a much more chilling effect upon non-
managerial employees because they will know that a sentencing 
judge will be powerless to take into account their good faith, 
their lack of a financial interest, or any other mitigating 
circumstances. 
On numerous occasions, the United States Supreme Court 
has recognized that First Amendment 
fragile ones that "are vulnerable to 
rights are extremely 
gravely damaging yet 
barely visible encroachments." Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 
372 U.S. 58, 66, 83 S.Ct. 631, 637 (1963). It is respectfully 
submitted that a mandatory jail sentence requirement for all 
first time violators of the state censorship law is the epitomy 
of an encroachment on First Amendment rights which is "barely 
''lsible" but "gravely damaging". 
Furthermore, the mere fact that mandatory sentences may 
be found permissible when applied in other contexts where such 
sentences will have no impact on First Amendment rights is no 
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basis for a conclusion that such laws are permissible punish-
ment for censorship violations. In Smith v . Ca 11 for n i a , 3 6 : 
U.S. 14 7' 80 S.Ct. 215 ( 19 5 9) ' the Supreme Court held 
unconstitutional an ordinance which au th or i zed the convict ion 
of a book seller for possession of an obscene book without 
proof of scienter. The Court stated: 
"Our decisions furnish examples of legal 
devices and doctrines, in most applications 
consistent with the Constitution, which cannot 
be applied in settings where they have the 
collateral effect of inhibiting the freedoms 
of expression, by making the individual the 
more reluctant to exercise it. Id. at 
150-151, 80 S.Ct. at 217. 
* * * 
[O]ur holding in Roth, does not recognize any 
state power to restrict the dissemination of 
books which are not obscene Id. at 
152, 80 S.Ct. at 218. 
* * * 
The existence of the State's power to prevent 
the distribution of obscene matter does not 
mean that there can be no constitutional 
barrier to any form of practical exercise of 
that power." Id. at 155, 80 S.Ct. at 220 
(emphasis added"""). 
Simply because the state has the power to punish obscenity 
violations with traditional criminal sentences including the 
possibility of jail time, it does not automatically follow that 
there is no constitutional barrier to the state's implementa-
tion of that power by the uniquely stifling practice of manda-
tory jail sentences for first time offenders. 
Although the present case is one of first impression, the 
appropriate method for analyzing the validity or not of the 
statute was articulated most clearly in Speiser v. Randall, 357 
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-,11, 520, 78 S.Ct. 1332, 1339 (1958) as follows: 
"When we deal with the complex of strands 
in the web of freedoms which make up free 
speech, the operation and effect of the method 
by which----rlllegitmate] speech is sought to be 
restrained must be subjected to close analysis 
and critical judgment in the light of the 
particular circumstances to which it is 
applied." (Emphasis added.) 
The "method by which [illegimate] speech is sought to be 
restrained" in the present case is the utilization of mandatory 
Jail sentences for every first time violation of the state's 
censorship laws. As Speiser, supra, teaches, the "effect" of 
this "method" "must be subjected to closed analysis and 
critical judgment". The effect of this method of punishment, 
if upheld by this Court, will undoubtedly be the virtual 
elimination of all constitutionally protected sexually oriented 
media material throughout the state because of the inability of 
bookstore and theater owners to find employees willing to risk 
certain jail time in the event that they make an incorrect 
guess as to whether a particular film or magazine will 
ultimately be found obscene. 
In Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 529-532, 65 S.Ct.315, 
322-323 (1945), the supreme Court stated: 
"This case confronts us again with the 
duty our system places on this Court to say 
where the individual's freedom ends and the 
State's power begins. Choice on that border, 
now as always delicate, is perhaps more so 
where the usual presumption supporting 
legislation is balanced by the preferred place 
given in our [constitutional] scheme to the 
great, the indispensible democratic freedoms 
secured by the First Amendment. [Citations 
omitted.] That priority gives these 
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liberties a sanctitv and a sanct1un not 
permitting dubious intrusions. AnJ it is tho 
character of the right, not of the 11mitat1un, 
which determines what standard governs the 
choice." (Emphasis added.) Id. at 529-530, 65 
s.ct. at 322. 
"For these reasons any attempt to re-
strict those liberties must be Justified by 
clear public interest, threatened nut doubt-
fully or remotely, but by clear and present 
danger. The rational connection between the 
remedy provided and the evil to be curbed, 
which in other contexts might support 
legislation against attack on due process 
grounds, will not suffice. These rights rest 
on firmer foundation." (Emphasis added.) Id. 
at 530, 65 S.Ct. at 322-323. 
As the cases above teach, legislation which otherwise 
enjoys a presumption of validity, loses this favored 
presumption when an attack is made thereon on First Amendment 
grounds. As a result, the burden is clearly on the State to 
justify the need for mandatory jail sentences. 
It is respectfully submitted that the only conceivable 
reason for these sentences was to create a sufficiently strong 
deterrent that no clerk or ticket taker would dare sell or 
exhibit ~ sexually oriented media material, even though it 
might well be constitutionally protected. 
The cost of eliminating obscene books, films and magazines 
from the State of Utah is the certain elimination of all 
material which deals with sex. Notwithstanding the rulings of 
the learned District and Circuit Courts, our Constitution 
compels a rejection of that cost as being much too high. 
II 
II 
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II 
THE MANDATORY JAIL SENTENCE REQUIREMENT OF 
U.C.A. §76-10-1204(2) CONSTITUTES CRUEL AND 
UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT IN VIOLATION OF THE 
EIGHTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION [AS INTERPRETED 
IN SOLEM v. HELM, 103 S.CT. 3001 (1983)] 
AND, INDEPENDENTLY, ARTICLE I, §9 OF THE 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH. 
Under Utah law, it was within the discretion of the trial 
court to impose a jail sentence of up to one year for the 
offense committed by appellant if the trial court thought such 
a sentence would be warranted under the circumstances of this 
particular case. Appellant does not challenge in any way the 
potential statutory maximum sentence of one year. Rather, it 
is exclusively the mandatory, non-suspendable minimum seven day 
jail sentence required by the statute in every case no matter 
what the present mitigating factors might be, that renders this 
statute violative of the state and federal constitutional 
guarantees against cruel and unusual punishments. 
Subsequent to the district and circuit courts' rulings on 
this point, the United States Supreme Court handed down a 
landmark Eighth Amendment decision which totally rejects the 
i easoning re lied upon by the State in the lower courts. In 
Solem v. Helm, U.S. , 103 S.Ct. 3001 (1983), the United 
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States Supreme Court squarely held that the Eighth i\mendment's 
prohibition of "cruel and unusual punishments" "prohibits not 
only barbaric punishments, but also sentences that are 
disproportionate to the er ime committed." 103 S.Ct. at 3006. 
In overturning a life sentence, the Court articulated a new 
three part "proportionality analysis" that must be applied in 
every case where an Eighth Amendment challenge is raised. 
Before analyzing U.C.A. §76-10-1204(2) under the Supreme 
Court's newly required "proportionality analysis", it is 
extremely signficant to the present case to note that the 
Supreme Court expressly concluded that even a one day jail 
sentence could be impermissible. At 103 S.Ct. at 3009, the 
Court stated: 
"But no penalty is ~ se constitutional. As 
the Court noted in Robinson v. California, 370 
U.S. at 667, 882 S.Ct. at 1420, a single day 
in prison ma~ be unconstitutional in some 
circumstances.1 (Emphasis added.) 
Thereafter, the Court summarized the provisions of its 
newly decided three part test for proportionality: 
"In sum, a court's proportionality anal-
ysis under the Eighth Amendment should be 
guided by objective criteria, including (i) 
the gravity of the offense and the harshness 
of the penalty; (ii) the sentences imposed on 
other criminals in the same jurisdiction; and 
(iii) the sentences imposed for commission of 
the same crime in other jurisdictions." 103 
S.Ct. at 3010-3011. 
Appellant respectfully submits that U.C.A. §76-10-1204(2) 
must fall when measured under the three part test set out 
above. 
II 
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The Gravity of the Offense and the Harshness of the 
Penalty. 
patron to 
The offense of selling a ticket to a consenting adult 
view an obscene film ii in an enclosed theatre can 
hardly be considered a "grave" offense in any sense of the 
word. There are no specific victims for this type of a crime 
and the only conceivable harm suffered by society is the 
legislatively presumed injury to public morals. Where the 
defendant is simply a ticket taker rather than a manager or an 
owner of such a business, the gravity of the offense is even 
more minimal. While the one year maximum jail sentence is 
concededly within constitutional limits, a mandatory minimum 
seven day jail sentence applicable in every case regardless of 
any mitigating circumstances is an extremely harsh penalty for 
so comparatively minor an offense. 
B. Applicable Sentences Under Utah Law for Other Offenses. 
As previously noted herein, at the time the offense 
herein was committed, there was no other mandatory jail sen-
tence in the Utah Criminal Code (U.C.A. Title 76), even for 
felony offenders, unless the offense was a capital offense. 
4 I 
It must be remembered that only 
final will the obscenity of the 
determined--obviously, substantially 
conduct in question. 
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when the case at bar 
film in question 
after the fact of 
is 
be 
the 
Recent:·_;, .1 r.GIT...LL'r 
the Lr im1n....1~ (-:,.Jc. •,.,, 
counsP l, t r~1-·s1· r:-.1;·,,1 i • 
t"elon1es ar-.J ::.ot r · , l I-- t-·t l 1 .1:. t 
st.:itc with rPaS('n.J.Dlc 21·r:.-11;,t_ 
punishes censorship violat1•ns far ~er~ harshly than any othc1 
offense of comparable gravity. 
C. Laws in Other Jur1sd1ct1ons. 
Counsel are unaware of mandatory ca1l sentence require-
men ts tor f1rst-t1me obscenity violators any other 
Jur1sd1ct1ons. To the extent that the State may find any 
states with such a requirement, it is respectfully submitted 
that they would be in the extreme minority of Jurisdictions. 
For all the reasons set forth above, it is respectfull:· 
submitted that the mandatory nature of the statute's m1n1mum 
Jail sentence is extremely harsh and disproportionate as 
applied to a first-time \"iolator of the state's misdemeanor 
censorship laws who is simply working as a ticket seller and 
who had no f1nanclal interest in the outcome of the business 
other than her :1ourly wa~es. For these reasons, this case 
J l - ::. t-_' ~ (_' • ,.]['!: 
gra\·1t~· 0! the 0:::·t'r:s1? ·-:1:~!-c-:-:. 
I I I 
\vl1H'l:., AS HERE, UTAH LAI> DGES NOT REQUIRE 
MANDATURY JAIL SENTENCES FOR OFFENSES OF 
'-'OMPARABLE SEVERITY, AND PARTICULARLY 
WHERE, AS HERE, THIS DISCRIMINATORY 
TREATMENT IS DIRECTED AT THOSE WHO ENGAGE 
IN A MEDIUM OF CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED 
SPEECH, THE MANDATORY SENTENCING PROVISION 
OF U.C.A. §76-10-1204(2) VIOLATES THE EQUAL 
PROTECTION GUARANTEE OF THE FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
AND THE PARALLEL REQUIREMENT OF ARTICLE I, 
§24 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF UTAH. 
In U.C.A. §76-3-204 (1), the Utah Legislature set forth 
•lie terms of imprisonment to apply to all class A misdemeanors. 
r!1at statute provides that the sentence of imprisonment in the 
·'~" of a class A misdemeanor shall be "for a term not exceed-
'"~ ,-nc year". By imposing the additional harsh requirement of 
mdndatory minimum seven day Jail sentence in all cases 
111s1nq under the state censorship statute, the Legislature has 
-, .Hed differently and more harshly the violators of that 
·,cular c~ass A misdemeanor than those who violate any other 
:nisdemeanor arising under the Criminal Code (Title 76 
·. tuh Code Annotated). 
~reating those who violate this particular class A 
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misdemeanor much more harshly than those th3t violate most, if 
not all, other class A misdemeanor prov1s1ons, the Leg1slatur• 
has unquestionably imposed discriminatory punishment against 
the class of individuals who violate the state's censorship 
law. 
Appellant concedes that under a mere rational basis test, 
the Legislature might be entitled to pick and choose and impose 
greater punishments for certain offenses than for other offen-
ses of the same classification. However, where, as here, the 
equal protection claim is raised in the context of a discrimi-
nation applicable to those engaged in ongoing businesses fully 
protected by the First Amendment and where, as here, the effect 
of these harsh penalties is to prospectively stifle and chill 
the exercise of First Amendment rights by extremely harsh 
mandatory jail sentences, a standard of strict judicial scru-
tiny is required. As the Supreme Court held in the case of 
Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 215, 95 S.Ct. 
2268, 2275-2276 (1975): 
"This court frequently has upheld under-
inclusive classifications on the sound theory 
that a legislature may deal with one part of a 
problem without addressing all of it. This 
presumption of statutory validity, however, 
has less force when a classification turns on 
the subject matter of expression." 
By requiring harsh mandatory minimum jail sentences only 
for those class A misdemeanor defendants who are engaged in 
presumptively protected speech, the Legislature has clearly 
based its discriminatory treatment upon a classification which 
turns on the subject matter of expression. Because of the 
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,,t1'1e chilling impact of these harsh sentencing laws on 
: "ture ability of theatres and bookstores to sell or 
,,hii,it presumptively protected materials, it is no answer for 
thee state to contend that a rational basis test should apply 
simply because in any given case the sentence will be imposed 
only after a finding of obscenity. 
Under the test of strict scrutiny applicable to this dis-
criminatory treatement, the State cannot possibly justify its 
harsh and discriminatory treatment of first-time violators of 
its censorship statute as being necessary for the effectuation 
of any legitimate and compelling state purposes. Although, no 
doubt, such sentences will quite effectively serve a legitimate 
state interest in deterring obscene expression, the statute's 
extreme deterrent impact upon protected expression renders 
these harsh penalties impermissible in violation of the state 
and federal constitutional guarantees of equal protection and 
freedom of speech. 
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IV 
THE MANDATORY SENTENCING REQUIREMENT OF 
U.C.A.§76-10-1204 (2) VIOLATES THE DOCTRINE 
OF SEPARATION OF POWERS MANDATED BY ARTICLE 
V, §1 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF UTAH BY 
DEPRIVING A TRIAL COURT OF ITS TRADITIONAL 
JUDICIAL FUNCTION OF DETERMINING WHETHER, 
UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF A PARTICULAR 
CASE, A JAIL SENTENCE WOULD MORE APPROPRI-
ATELY BE SUSPENDED PENDING SUCCESSFUL 
COMPLETION OF PROBATION. 
Article V, §1 of the Constitution of Utah states: 
"Section 1. 
ment) . 
(Three departments of Govern-
"The powers of the government of the State 
of Utah shall be divided into three distinct 
departments, the Legislative, the Executive, 
and the Judicial, and no person charged with 
the exercise of powers properly belonging to 
one of these departments shall exercise any 
functions appertaining to either of the 
others, except in the cases herein expressly 
directed or permitted." (Emphasis added.) 
While it is no doubt the province of the Legislature to 
determine the range of permissible punishments for the viola-
tions of criminal statutes, it has always been a traditional 
judicial function to choose between a range of legislatively 
prescribed punishments or to determine whether, under the facts 
of a particular case, the ends of justice would be more 
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, 1 ~r,,,_,,_,r1ately served by suspending execution of a sentence 
1 nq successful completion of a term of probation. 
~v1dence of the traditional "judicial" nature of the act 
sentencing is provided by U.C.A. §77-18-1, which provides, 
1n pertinent part, as follows: 
"§77-18-1. Suspension of Sentence--Probation--
Period--Condi tions--Revoca tion. (1) On a 
plea of guilty or no contest or conviction of 
~ crime or offense, if it appears compatible 
with the public interest, the court may sus-
pend the imposition or execution of sentence 
and place the defendant on probation for such 
period of time as it determines." (Emphasis 
added.) 
It is respectfully submitted that the decision of whether 
a particular criminal defendant should qualify for suspension 
of sentence or for a term of probation is a traditional 
judicial function and the Legislature's attempt to deprive the 
courts of this function by enacting U.C.A. §76-10-1204(2) is an 
impermissible exercise of judicial powers in violation of the 
express requirements of Article V, §1 of the Constitution of 
Utah. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the Legislature 
intended to accomplish censorship of both protected as well as 
unprotected expression in enacting U.C.A. §76-10-1204 (2). Its 
intent is amply evidenced by the fact that, at the time it was 
-nacted, the statute's mandatory jail requirement was the only 
~andatory sentencing requirement in the Utah Criminal Code for 
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non-capital offenses. 
deter the exercise of unprotected eoq,r<ess1< r, 
equally clear that it may well also completel 1 ,eliminate •_ri. 
distribution of protected expression which lS sexual! 
oriented. Simply stated, no hourly wage clerk or ticket taker 
in the state will have the sort of vested interest necessary to 
justify the risk of a mandatory seven day Jail sentence in the 
event that he or she misjudges whether a particular publication 
will subsequently be found obscene. The pall of fear and 
timidity which will be established if this Court upholds these 
mandatory jail requirements is too great a pr ice for a free 
society to pay to preclude the possibility that a seller of a 
ticket to an obscene film might receive a suspended Jail 
sentence upon being convicted for his or her first offense. 
Given the fact that Utah has a comparatively stiff 
maximum sentence of one year for first-time offenders, subJeCt 
to the sentencing discretion of the trial court, there is no 
legitimate governmental interest in depriving sentencing judges 
of their traditional discretion in determining whether, under 
the facts of a particular case, sufficiently mitigating factors 
exist to suspend imposition of a sentence to a first-time 
violator of the State's inherently imprecise obscenity laws. 
For all these reasons, it is respectfully submitted that 
this case be remanded to the Circuit Court for resentencing 
under the general sentencing provisions applicable to all cl.1~s 
A misdemeanors and that the Circuit Court be freed of the 
II 
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_,,, t1 1 ons on its discretion presently embodied in U.C.A. 
[ L () 4 ( 2) • 
LJATED: August 12, 1983 
Respectfully submitted, 
JOHN H. WESTON 
G. RANDALL GARROU 
BROWN, WESTON & SARNO 
JEROME H. MOONEY 
MOONEY & SMITH 
ByG~~ 
Attorneys for Appellant 
-27-
i1 ·1~ - : ~uve re;id the !or-;go1ng document and know its contents The matters stated in 1t are true of my own 
1'. tu~,"·''~" 111Jt1Pr~. wh1f.h are stated on 1nformat1on and be!1el. and as to those matters I believe them to be true 
ol 
.Jrd arr. authorized to ma~e this verif1cat1on for and on its behalf. and I make this 
1;d 1111 ha•e read the !orego1ng document and know its contents I am informed and beheve and on that ground allege 
',I• t::d If' I\ d'8 true 
u· I-' 'Jf !IY' dilorrf:'y'> for __ 
1 , 1r'1'> ac11on Sll'..h party is aosent from !he county of aforesaid where such attorneys have their ottice. and I make this verification 
,nr ::ir'1 .'r bt:hdll of 1hJ\ party for that reason I have read the lorego1ng document and know 1ls contents I am informed and believe and on 
!hal J'Ci;iiC allege that the matters stated 1n 11 are !rue 
be•11ledon _ _ ______ , 19_,at -~ , California. 
1 aecldre under penaity 01 periury Iha! the above 1s true and correct 
(Signature) 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this ____ _ day of-------------------· 19 __ . 
Nola''/ Public 1n and tor s.l1d County and Slate 
ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF RECEIPT 
------------------- 19~-
(Signature) 
PROOF OF SERVICE BY MAIL 
Evan_ge l ina Fr_ar1_ces CardenC':s ______ am d resident of/employed in the county aforesaid, 
::iqr: :Jf i3 vt::drS Jrd not a p.:rty to the w1!h1n act1or fllY business/residence address is 
431 North Camden Drive, Suite 900 
Beverly Hills, CA 90210 
August 13 19 8 3 1 served the within __ c8_rief_ 9~pellant ___________ _ 
1se1 1or1n 1n~ exacl title ol the document served) 
13_e ve r 1:_y _Ii i_lJ:_~ _CF>.__ 
See Attached Mailing List 
.1'\11gust lJ 
19 
~3, 1 -· Beverly Hills 
1cheo. a:;phcJb'P OJrJgrJ;:ih oe1ow1 
------· California 
]" uf iJPr 1ur 1 lhdt the above 1s lrue and correct 
t-'1',<='·J·,nJ 1r, 1~~ Jr11ce ol 0 inernber 01 the b;ir ot this cour! at whose d1rect1on the service was made 
l F1 1ME fl. MOONEY 
1r11 rJl i .-. SMITH 
1 1tr1 300 East 
fake City, Utah 84111 
·T!\N uLSEN 
ASSISTANT CITY PROSECUTOR 
451 South 200 East 
Suite 125 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
MAILING LIST 
